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Understanding New York’s “Mode of
Proceedings” Muddle
GARY MULDOON†
INTRODUCTION
One of the more challenging areas of criminal law in
New York State is the doctrine known as “mode of
proceedings” error. Under the mode of proceedings rule,
certain variances in fundamental procedure, usually
occurring at trial, will result in reversal despite lack of
preservation.1 Because mode of proceedings error almost
always arises as a result of errors that were not preserved
at trial, many experienced trial attorneys are unfamiliar
with it. It is also a vexing area for appellate practitioners.
Decisions of the New York Court of Appeals have not always
been clear in illuminating the rule‟s scope and application,
greatly complicating the task of appellate counsel faced with
unpreserved error.
Even though the doctrine was first articulated in 1858
in Cancemi v. People, 2 the muddle persists. Reversing the
defendant‟s conviction by a jury of eleven persons, to which
the defendant had consented,3 the New York Court of
Appeals stated that “changes in great and leading
provisions as to the organization of the tribunals or the
† Partner, Muldoon & Getz, Rochester, N.Y. Adjunct instructor, University at
Buffalo Law School. J.D., University at Buffalo Law School; B.A., Skidmore
College. I would like to thank Martin P. McCarthy, II, of Muldoon & Getz, and
Patrick A. Sheldon, J.D. Candidate, Class of 2012, University at Buffalo Law
School, for their assistance.
1. Examples of procedural errors that are considered fundamental, and that
thus rise to the level of mode of proceedings error, include: responding to jury
questions, see infra Part III.A, judicial absence from trial, see infra Part III.B,
sufficiency of accusatory instruments, see infra Part III.H, and waiver of the
twelve-person jury, see infra Part III.I. For further examples and discussion, see
infra Part III.
2. 18 N.Y. 128, 137-38 (1858).
3. Id. at 130, 131.
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mode of proceeding prescribed by the constitution and the
laws” are not permitted.4 The doctrine remained largely
dormant for more than a century, when it was revived in
People v. Patterson, a decision that rejected application of
mode of proceedings on the facts presented.5 In Patterson,
the Court of Appeals described the doctrine thus: “[E]rror
that would affect the organization of the court or the mode
of proceedings prescribed by law” will result in reversal
regardless of preservation at the trial-court level.6 The court
continued:
[T]he purpose of this narrow, historical exception is to ensure that
criminal trials are conducted in accordance with the mode of
procedure mandated by Constitution and statute. Where the
procedure adopted by the court below is at a basic variance with
7
the mandate of law, the entire trial is irreparably tainted.

Despite this formulation, mode of proceedings decisions
have not particularly focused on constitutional issues. In
part, as the Court of Appeals has observed, many
“constitutional rights are waived if not preserved.”8 It has
instead been applied more often in the case of variations
from procedural statutes.9 Additionally, the impact of the

4. Id. at 137.
5. People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 902, 909 (N.Y. 1976), aff’d, 432 U.S.
197 (1977). In People v. Agramonte, 665 N.E.2d 164, 166 (N.Y. 1996), Chief
Judge Kaye referred to “the seminal Patterson case.” A Third Department
decision has referred to mode of proceedings as “the Patterson rule.” People v.
Davis, 687 N.Y.S.2d 803, 807 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 1999).
6. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 902. Although the New York Reports varies from
the wording of the North Eastern Reporter and states “proscribed by law,”
Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 295 (1976), most later decisions, consistent with the
North Eastern Reporter, have used “mode of proceedings prescribed by law.”
See, e.g., People v. Ahmed, 487 N.E.2d 894, 895 (N.Y. 1985).
7. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 903.
8. People v. Thomas, 407 N.E.2d 430, 433 (N.Y. 1980); see also People v.
Kelly, 832 N.E.2d 1179, 1181 n.2 (N.Y. 2005); People v. Voliton, 630 N.E.2d 641,
643 (N.Y. 1994) (“We have generally applied the preservation rule to due process
objections.”). However, mode of proceedings applies to some violations of
constitutional double jeopardy. People v. Williams, 925 N.E.2d 878, 892 (N.Y.
2010); see infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Voliton, 630 N.E.2d at 643.
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common law upon the doctrine has also been emphasized by
the Court of Appeals.10
I. THE PRESERVATION RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The preservation rule is a mainstay of both civil and
criminal appellate review.11 In order to raise a question of
law for review on appeal, a contemporaneous objection must
be made in the court below.12 Failure to object or otherwise
register a protest renders the issue unpreserved, allowing
an intermediate appellate court to decline review of the
issue.13
The preservation rule was discussed in People v.
Patterson in the context of scope of jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals:
A defendant cannot be permitted to sit idly by while error is
committed, thereby allowing the error to pass into the record
uncured, and yet claim the error on appeal. Were the rule
otherwise, the State‟s fundamental interest in enforcing its
criminal law could be frustrated by delay and waste of time and
14
resources invited by a defendant.

10. See People v. Webb, 581 N.E.2d 509, 511 (N.Y. 1991); see also infra note
181 and accompanying text.
11. The rule applies to both the appellant and the respondent. See People v.
Concepcion, 953 N.E.2d 779, 782-83 (N.Y. 2011); People v. LaFontaine, 705
N.E.2d 663, 665 (N.Y. 1998).
12. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.05(2) (McKinney 2009). The preservation
requirement also applies with federal habeas corpus proceedings from state
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006); O‟Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
842-48 (1999); see also Richardson v. Greene 497 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2007).
But with one purported mode of proceedings error (judicial delegation), the
absence of a contemporaneous objection did not preclude federal review, where
the state court requirement of preservation was not firmly established. See
Monroe v. Kuhlman, 433 F.3d 236, 240-45 (2d Cir. 2006).
13. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.05(2); People v. Thomas, 407 N.E.2d 430,
432 (N.Y. 1980); People v. Udzinski, 541 N.Y.S.2d 9, 11 (App. Div. 1989).
14. People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 902 (N.Y. 1976), aff’d, 432 U.S. 197
(1977). Similarly, in People v. Becoats, 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 07306, at*3, 2011 WL
4972341 (N.Y. Oct. 20, 2011), the court stated that “to allow an unpreserved
claim of duplicitousness to be raised on appeal would open the door to abuse. . . .
To expand the definition of „mode of proceedings‟ error too freely would create
many . . . anomalous results.”
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However, there are exceptions to the preservation rule.
By statute, an intermediate appellate court is permitted
review of unpreserved errors “[a]s a matter of discretion in
the interest of justice.”15 The intermediate appellate court
may “consider and determine any question of law or issue of
fact involving error or defect in the criminal court
proceedings which may have adversely affected the
appellant.”16 Interest of justice jurisdiction is conferred
exclusively on the intermediate appellate courts, as the
Court of Appeals lacks such jurisdiction.17
Mode of proceedings error is another subset of
exceptions to the preservation rule.18 Within it, specific
issues have been held to be reviewable on appeal despite
lack of preservation.19 It is intriguing that certain issues
found unpreserved yet reversible have not been termed
mode of proceedings errors.20 One appellate court has
observed, “[c]onsidering the scope and number of the truly
fundamental errors to which the preservation doctrine does
apply, one encounters difficulty in deriving from precedent a
15. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15(3)(c) (McKinney 2009); see People v.
Robinson, 326 N.E.2d 784, 786 (N.Y. 1975).
16. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15(1); People v. Kelly, 832 N.E.2d 1179, 1181
n.1 (N.Y. 2005). When the intermediate appellate court exercises its
discretionary interest of justice jurisdiction, the ruling is generally beyond the
review power of the Court of Appeals. People v. Turriago, 681 N.E.2d 350, 35354 (N.Y. 1997); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.90(2)(a) (McKinney 2009).
17. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.35 (McKinney 2009). Trial courts also
lack interest of justice jurisdiction. People v. Sinha, 922 N.Y.S.2d 275, 279 (App.
Div. 2011).
18. See People v. Udzinski, 541 N.Y.S.2d 9, 13-14 (App. Div. 1989). Mode of
proceedings is akin to the “interest of justice” exception only insofar as it deals
with unpreserved error.
19. See Misicki v. Caradonna, 909 N.E.2d 1213, 1223 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J.,
dissenting). One of these is the “rare case” exception with a guilty plea: if the
factual allocution raises a defense or denies an element of the crime, the
defendant may raise the issue on appeal without having preserved it below.
People v. Lopez, 525 N.E.2d 5, 6-7 (N.Y. 1988).
20. See, e.g., People v. Hartson, 553 N.Y.S.2d 537, 539 (App. Div. 1990) (trial
judge‟s spouse serving as a juror); see also People v. Shepherd, 500 N.E.2d 871,
872 (N.Y. 1986) (town court proceeding held outside of town). With sentencing,
“„the essential nature‟ of the right to be sentenced as provided by law, though
not formally raised at the trial level, preserves a departure therefrom for
review” by the Court of Appeals. People v. Fuller, 441 N.E.2d 563, 565 (N.Y.
1982).
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rigid standard by which to ascertain those errors to which
the doctrine does not apply.”21 The same could well be said
of mode of proceedings.
II. MODE OF PROCEEDINGS

A. Basics of the Doctrine
“Mode of proceedings” is an umbrella term for a loose
grouping of various process-oriented errors. The doctrine is
a subset of unpreserved error, which in turn is a small
exception to the preservation rule.22 Mode of proceedings
has been mainly applied with issues arising at trial, but
other jurisdictional issues have been recognized by
appellate courts.23 The doctrine is specific to New York and
unrecognized in the courts of other states.24 The concept of
“structural” or “fundamental” error is perhaps its closest
federal analogue.25
21. Udzinski, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 13-14 (citations omitted).
22. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See State v. Barksdale, 638 S.E.2d 579, 584 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (using
the term “mode of proceedings proscribed by law” in referencing New York law);
State v. Allocco, 644 A.2d 835, 837 (Vt. 1994) (using the term “mode of
proceedings prescribed by law” while citing and distinguishing People v. Coons,
551 N.E.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. 1990), discussed infra Part III.F). A few older
decisions used the phrase “mode of proceeding prescribed by law,” but none with
reference to criminal law. See, e.g., Lybrand v. Forman, 67 So. 2d 4, 5 (Ala.
1953). The only federal decisions using the term “mode of proceedings proscribed
by law” are from New York, typically in a habeas corpus posture. See, e.g.,
Monroe v. Kuhlman, 433 F.3d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 2006).
25. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1999) (“Each of these
constitutional deprivations is a similar structural defect affecting the
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the
trial process itself. „Without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot
reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence,
and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.‟” (quoting
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986))); see also Udzinski, 541 N.Y.S.2d at
13 (“[S]uch an error in the Federal courts may be considered so fundamental as
to be properly reviewable as a matter of discretion.” (citations omitted)); 37 GEO.
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 849-50 (2008) (“„Structural errors‟—defects that
fundamentally undermine the reliability and fairness of the trial—can never be
found to have been harmless.”). In contrast, “plain error,” which occurs where
error was unpreserved, has a prejudice component: the error must affect
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Where a mode of proceedings error occurs, the
defendant need not show any specific prejudice from the
procedural error:
[C]ertain kinds of errors occurring during trial are intrinsically
prejudicial because they either detract from the process or impair
the defendant‟s ability to present a defense. In such instances, a
so-called “per se” rule of reversal is applied. The use of the term
“per se” in this context does not denote a complete absence of
prejudice; rather, it represents a shorthand way of saying that
errors within that class are prejudicial by their very nature and
that, accordingly, nothing further need be shown to compel
26
reversal.

Thus, harmless error analysis is inapplicable with mode
of proceedings error.27 In many situations where a mode
error has been found, it would indeed be difficult to
demonstrate actual prejudice.28 To require demonstrable
prejudice where defense counsel placed no objection on the
record in most mode situations would allow the
fundamental procedural deviation to pass unchallenged.
Yet, this is something that appellate courts frequently allow
when applying harmless error analysis to non-fundamental
errors (procedural
and substantive), even when
preservation has occurred.29 Moreover, according to earlier
decisions, a defendant cannot waive or even consent to a
mode of proceedings error.30 For these reasons, when
substantial rights. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). For a list of structural errors, see
GORDON MEHLER, JOHN GLEESON & DAVID C. JAMES, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PRACTICE: A SECOND CIRCUIT HANDBOOK §§ 1-15 (11th ed. 2011).
26. People v. Jackson, 585 N.E.2d 795, 805 (N.Y. 1991) (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
27. People v. Mehmedi, 505 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 1987); People v. Miller, 901
N.Y.S.2d 444, 445 (App. Div. 2010).
28. See Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64 (1st Cir. 2007) (recognizing,
at the federal level, the difficulty of showing prejudice from structural error).
29. See, e.g., People v. Hamlin, 525 N.E.2d 719, 721-23 (N.Y. 1988) (finding
harmless error despite constitutional error of Confrontation Clause violation);
People v. Crimmins, 326 N.E.2d 787, 791 (N.Y. 1975) (finding harmless error
despite the constitutional error of improper prosecutorial statement).
30. See People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 902 (N.Y. 1976), aff’d, 432 U.S.
197 (1977); see also People v. Michael, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 1136-37 (N.Y. 1979). As
discussed infra Part III.I, the Court of Appeals has more recently suggested that
a defendant may waive or consent to certain changes in the mode of
proceedings—or that certain variations in procedure no longer are mode
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dealing with an unpreserved issue at the trial level, defense
counsel on appeal may seek shelter under the mode of
proceedings umbrella.
The mode doctrine is also important because the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is constitutionally
limited to reviewing questions of law.31 If an issue comes
within the ambit of mode of proceedings, the Court of
Appeals is presented with an error of law it may review.32 In
contrast, an intermediate appellate court‟s review of an
unpreserved issue based on “interest of justice” jurisdiction33
may bar further review of the issue by the Court of
Appeals.34 If an unpreserved issue comes within the area of
mode of proceedings, the Court of Appeals may allow its
review, even if the court ultimately holds that preservation
was required.35 For example, lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction has been held to be a mode of proceedings issue,
allowing review by the Court of Appeals, even though the
court then held the particular issue was “the equivalent of
an improper venue claim,” not jurisdictional in nature, and
therefore required preservation to challenge it on appeal.36
With some decisions, the mode doctrine may be read as
a sub silentio means of addressing defense counsel‟s failure
to preserve baseline errors.37 Although mode of proceedings
errors are generally judicial in nature, courts have also
reviewed errors that the defense attorney could not
violations and can be consented to. See, e.g., People v. Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d
863, 868 (N.Y. 2007) (allowing waiver of twelve-person jury). But see People v.
Becoats, 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 07306, at *2, 2011 WL 4972341 (N.Y. Oct. 20, 2011)
(“We said in Patterson: „A defendant in a criminal case cannot waive, or even
consent to, error that would affect the organization of the court or the mode of
proceedings prescribed by law.‟” (citation omitted)).
31. N.Y. CONST . art. VI, § 3(a).
32. People v. Kelly, 832 N.E.2d 1179, 1181 (N.Y. 2005); see ARTHUR KARGER,
THE POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS § 21:11 (3d ed. 2005).
33. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15(3)(c) (McKinney 2009).
34. See People v. Cona, 399 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (N.Y. 1979).
35. See People v. Wilson, 931 N.E.2d 69, 69-70 (N.Y. 2010).
36. Id. at 70; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.35 (McKinney 2009); People
v. Carvajal, 845 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (N.Y. 2005).
37. However, the mode doctrine is plainly not intended as a backstop for
addressing ineffectiveness issues.
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reasonably have been expected to preserve.38 In Patterson,
the Court of Appeals allowed the defendant to raise the
argument that he was deprived of a properly conducted
trial, due to an illegal shift of the burden of proof, for the
first time on appeal.39 According to the court, “defendant‟s
failure to object was excusable because the statutory
practice had previously been deemed valid and had only
been called into question by an intervening Supreme Court
decision.”40 However, deviations from some procedures may
not fall into the category of mode of proceedings error where
“it is reasonable to require counsel to object.”41 Mode of
proceedings errors may occur when an error in the judicial
process is such that defense counsel cannot reasonably be
expected to defend the client against such error.
Because mode of proceedings doctrine applies to certain
procedural errors, those errors that “affect the substance,
not the mode of proceedings, of the trial” fall outside the
doctrine.42 With these, preservation is required.43 In one
case, the Court of Appeals rejected applying mode of
proceedings analysis to a suppression issue that was not
raised in the lower court, styling it a substantive due
38. See Misicki v. Caradonna, 909 N.E.2d 1213, 1223 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]e review . . . claims where it is unreasonable to expect them to
have been preserved below.”).
39. People v. Thomas, 407 N.E.2d 430, 432 (N.Y. 1980) (discussing People v.
Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. 1976), aff’d, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)).
40. Id. In Thomas, as in Patterson, an issue regarding improperly shifting the
burden of proof was raised; specifically, a jury instruction that a person can be
“presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act[s].” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). No mode error was found:
We recognize that at trial the defendant did not have the benefit of the
Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)] decision which was
announced after the trial was concluded. But Sandstrom did not alter
the law of this State. For more than a century, the charge condemned
in Sandstrom has been held by this court, to be erroneous as a matter
of State law.
Id. at 433 (citations omitted).
41. People v. Kisoon, 801 N.Y.S.2d 69, 71-72 (App. Div. 2005) (addressing the
handling of jury notes), aff’d, 863 N.E.2d 990 (N.Y. 2007). See infra Part III.A
for a more detailed discussion of jury notes as mode of proceedings error.
42. People v. Hawkins, 900 N.E.2d 946, 950 n.2 (N.Y. 2008).
43. See id. at 950 & n.2.
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process argument.44 But the dichotomy of process-procedure
versus substantive law is not easily divided.
While addressing the issue of legal sufficiency of
evidence presented at trial, the Court of Appeals in 1995
again attempted to explain the contours of the doctrine,
describing a mode of proceedings issue as one that:
[G]oes to the general and over-all procedure of the trial, forbidding
alteration of mandated procedural, structural and processoriented standards. The examples [of mode of proceedings
errors]—changing of the burden of proof, . . . deviation from State
constitutionally mandated requirements for an indictment—show
that the claimed errors [of legal insufficiency] should not fall
45
within that exception.

As stated a decade later by Judge Rosenblatt, this is “a
very narrow category of cases [with] errors that go to the
essential validity of the process and are so fundamental
that the entire trial is irreparably tainted.”46
Although mode of proceedings is a criminal law issue,
one dissenting opinion from the Court of Appeals has
suggested that it be applied in a civil case.47 One Appellate
Division decision has applied it to a quasi-criminal area,

44. People v. Voliton, 630 N.E.2d 641, 643 (N.Y. 1994). “Exceptions to the
preservation rule have been limited to errors going to the very organization of
the court or at such basic variance with the mode of procedure mandated by law
that they impair the essential validity of the criminal proceedings” and do not
include “due process objections.” Id. The Appellate Division had exercised its
interest of justice jurisdiction to dismiss two counts of assault in the second
degree on suppression grounds. People v. Voliton, 593 N.Y.S.2d 822, 822 (App.
Div. 1993), aff’d, 630 N.E.2d 641 (N.Y. 1994). Upon further appeal by the
defendant, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of two misdemeanor
counts. Voliton, 630 N.E.2d at 643.
45. People v. Gray, 652 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1995).
46. People v. Kelly, 832 N.E.2d 1179, 1181 (N.Y. 2005) (citation omitted). The
Court of Appeals has repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of the doctrine:
“Errors within this tightly circumscribed class are immune from the
requirement of preservation.” Id.; see also People v. Becoats, 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op.
07306, at *3, 2011 WL 4972341 (N.Y. Oct. 20, 2011) (“Not every procedural
misstep in a criminal case is a mode of proceedings error. That term is reserved
for the most fundamental flaws.”).
47. Misicki v. Caradonna, 909 N.E.2d 1213, 1223 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
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civil commitment.48 In another quasi-criminal area, the
transfer of a juvenile delinquency proceeding to Family
Court, defects in pleadings, not raised at the trial level,
were recognized as jurisdictional in nature and did not
require preservation.49
Non-preservation of a “mode” issue has even been
extended to cases where the error was not raised in the
intermediate appellate court. As the Court of Appeals stated
in 1979, “there exist certain rules of law, . . . which are so
basic to the validity of a criminal proceeding that the failure
to observe such a rule may be raised at any time during the
appellate process.”50 In two cases where a mode issue was
raised for the first time at the Court of Appeals, one was
remitted to the Appellate Division to consider the issue;51 in
the other, the Court of Appeals reviewed the issue rather
than remitting.52
B. Patterson: Revival of Mode of Proceedings
Before 1976, few decisions discussed mode of
proceedings error. Then came People v. Patterson.53 The
specific issue in Patterson, an appeal of a murder conviction,
was whether placing the burden of proof of an affirmative

48. See State v. Muench, 925 N.Y.S.2d 291, 292-93 (App. Div. 2011); see also
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.05-10.08 (McKinney 2011) (setting out procedure
for civil confinement of recidivistic sex offenders). However, the Court of
Appeals has refused to apply the mode doctrine to a sex offender risk level
reassessment hearing. Compare People v. Windham, 886 N.E.2d 179, 179-80
(N.Y. 2008), with People v. Samms, 731 N.E.2d 1118, 1120-22 (N.Y. 2000).
49. See In re Michael M., 821 N.E.2d 537, 542-43 (N.Y. 2004) (transfer of
juvenile offender prosecution).
50. People v. Michael, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 1136 (N.Y. 1979) (dictum); see infra
notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
51. People v. Caban, 927 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 2010). On remittal, a mode
error was found and the conviction was reversed. People v. Caban, 910 N.Y.S.2d
432, 433-34 (App. Div. 2010). Similarly, in People v. Correa, 897 N.Y.S.2d 14,
16-17 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2009), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 2010), after briefs
were filed, the First Department took the unusual step of requesting counsel to
submit supplemental briefs on issues related to mode of proceedings. See infra
Part III.D.
52. People v. Wilson, 931 N.E.2d 69-70 (N.Y. 2010).
53. 347 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. 1976), aff’d, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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defense (extreme emotional disturbance) on the defendant
violated due process.54 The issue was unpreserved at trial.55
In affirming the conviction, Judge Jasen noted that the
case constituted “one very narrow exception to the
requirement of a timely objection.”56 He continued, “[a]
defendant in a criminal case cannot waive, or even consent
to, error that would affect the organization of the court or
the mode of proceedings prescribed by law.”57 The majority
opinion did not address mode of proceedings further, but the
court found placing the burden of persuasion of the
affirmative defense on the defendant to be constitutional.58
Judge Jasen‟s re-recognition of mode of proceedings,
although dictum, has resulted in a burgeoning line of
cases.59
III. APPLICATION OF MODE OF PROCEEDINGS
Mode of proceedings can perhaps best be understood or
delineated by examples in which courts have applied it, as
well as examples in which it does not apply. The most
important or recurring issues include (1) responding to jury
questions;60 (2) judicial absence from part of the trial,
delegation of judicial responsibility, and communication
with the jury by someone other than the judge;61 (3) absence
of defendant or defense counsel;62 (4) errors in jury
instructions, which courts have usually held require
preservation;63 (5) jurisdiction of the court;64 (6) sufficiency of
accusatory instruments;65 and (7) the twelve-member jury.66
54. Id. at 900.
55. Id. at 900-02.
56. Id. at 902.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 906-08.
59. See infra Part III.
60. See People v. O‟Rama, 579 N.E.2d 189, 193 (N.Y. 1991).
61. See People v. Ahmed, 487 N.E.2d 894, 895 (N.Y. 1985).
62. See People v. Mehmedi, 505 N.E.2d 610, 611 (N.Y. 1987).
63. See Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 902.
64. See People v. Correa, 933 N.E.2d 705, 710 (N.Y. 2010).
65. See People v. Casey, 740 N.E.2d 233, 235, 237 (N.Y. 2000); People v.
Boston, 554 N.E.2d 64, 65, 66 (N.Y. 1990).
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Additional mode of proceedings errors include conviction of
a nonexistent crime,67 as well as certain fundamental rights
violations, such as double jeopardy. 68 The list is not
exhaustive.69
A. Responding to Jury Questions: O‟Rama
Mode of proceedings issues frequently arise when the
trial judge responds to jury questions. The Appellate
Division is divided on when to apply the doctrine, with some
appellate decisions applying it and other decisions rejecting
it. The New York Criminal Procedure Law requires that,
when the jury submits a question, “[u]pon such a request,
the court must direct that the jury be returned to the
courtroom and, after notice to both the people and counsel
for the defendant, and in the presence of the defendant,
must give such requested information or instruction as the
court deems proper.”70 This part of the trial has been
recognized by the Court of Appeals as crucial: supplemental
instructions “may well be determinative of the outcome of
the case, coming as they do in response to questions raised
by the jurors themselves.”71
66. See People v. Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d 863, 868-70 (N.Y. 2007).
67. People v. Martinez, 611 N.E.2d 277, 278 (N.Y. 1993). However, conviction
on two counts requiring inconsistent mental states does require preservation.
People v. Carter, 860 N.E.2d 50, 50-51 (N.Y. 2006). But see People v. Lee, 348
N.E.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. 1976) (dismissing an inclusory concurrent count of which
the defendant had been convicted); People v. Rodrigues, 902 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751
(App. Div. 2010) (citing Lee for the proposition that preservation is not required
to review conviction of an inclusory concurrent count).
68. People v. Michael, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 1135-36 (N.Y. 1979).
69. For example, mode of proceedings has been raised but rejected where the
claimed error was a duplicitous indictment. People v Becoats, 2011 N.Y. Slip.
Op. 07306, at *2, 2011 WL 4972341 (N.Y. Oct. 20, 2011); see also N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 200.30(1) (McKinney 2007) (“Each count of an indictment may
charge one offense only.”). In Becoats, the defendants argued that a single count
in the indictment for the robbery of a gun and the robbery of a pair of sneakers
was duplicitous. 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 07306, at *2, 2011 WL 4972341. But the
court explained: “They did not make this argument in the trial court, however,
and we hold that we may not consider it.” Id. Of the specific duplicitousness
issue raised, the court stated: “We express no opinion about the argument‟s
merit.” Id. at *3.
70. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.30 (McKinney 2002).
71. People v. Ciaccio, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 1350 (N.Y. 1979).
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Noncompliance with section 310.30 of the Criminal
Procedure Law constitutes error affecting the mode of
proceedings.72 But what constitutes noncompliance? The
leading case is People v. O’Rama.73 The trial judge‟s “core
responsibility74 under the statute” is to give “meaningful
notice” to the attorneys of the jury‟s request, in order to
allow counsel “to frame intelligent suggestions for the
fairest and least prejudicial response—and to provide a
meaningful response to the jury.”75 The O’Rama court set
forth the steps that a judge must follow when a
“substantive” written jury communication is received. 76
Those steps are (1) mark the communication as a court
exhibit; (2) before the jury is recalled, read it into the record
in the presence of counsel; (3) allow counsel the opportunity
to suggest appropriate responses; (4) inform counsel of the
substance of the intended responsive instruction; and (5)
when the jury returns, read the communication in open
court so that the individual jurors can correct any
inaccuracies in the transcription of the inquiry and the rest
of the panel can understand the court‟s response and its
context.77 Where a judge fails to notify counsel of the jury‟s
written question or to allow counsel to assist in formulating
the response, a mode of proceedings error results, and no
objection is required to preserve the issue.78
72. People v. O‟Rama, 579 N.E.2d 189, 193 (N.Y. 1991). In federal court,
where a deliberating jury requests further instructions, Rule 43 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure applies. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (“At trial, the
witnesses‟ testimony must be taken in open court . . . .”). As stated by the
Supreme Court, for “„orderly conduct of a trial by jury‟ . . . the jury‟s message
should [be] answered in open court and [defense] counsel should [be] given an
opportunity to be heard before the trial judge respond[s].” Rogers v. United
States, 422 U.S. 35, 39 (1975) (quoting Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583,
588-89 (1927)). In some cases violation of this practice may be harmless error.
Id. at 40.
73. 579 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1991). One appellate decision has referred to this as
“the O’Rama exception to the preservation requirement.” People v. Neal, 701
N.Y.S.2d 393, 394 (App. Div. 2000).
74. The term “core responsibility” has been used repeatedly with an O’Rama
error, but not with other mode errors.
75. People v. Kisoon, 863 N.E.2d 990, 992 (N.Y. 2007).
76. O’Rama, 579 N.E.2d at 192-93.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 193; see also People v. Tabb, 920 N.E.2d 90, 90 (N.Y. 2009).
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Not every variance from the O’Rama protocol requires
reversal. That decision noted that its intent was:
[N]ot to mandate adherence to a rigid set of procedures, but rather
to delineate a set of guidelines calculated to maximize
participation by counsel at a time when counsel‟s input is most
meaningful, i.e., before the court gives its formal response.
Accordingly, where there exist unique articulable circumstances
that make the foregoing steps impractical, modified procedures
that are equally conducive to participation by defense counsel are
79
permissible.

Preservation was required where, for example, the
judge read into the record the entire contents of notes
requesting a readback of certain terms, and defense counsel
was both given notice of the contents of the notes and had
knowledge of the court‟s intended response.80 Also, where
the judge sought clarification of the note from jurors before
notifying defense counsel, no error was found.81 Similarly,
no mode error occurred where Criminal Procedure Law
section 310.30 was violated but the defendant was acquitted
of the charges to which the jury questions were addressed.82
Where the jury submits more than one written question,
adherence to the O’Rama protocol with only one of the notes
does not suffice.83 And, if the jury asks additional questions
orally after the written question, and after counsel has
received notice, the better course is for a judge not to engage
in an oral dialogue but to require the jury to return with the
question in writing, allowing the O’Rama procedure
outlined above to take place.84
Where the trial judge instead engages in an oral
dialogue, a mode of proceedings error is not automatic.
79. O’Rama, 579 N.E.2d at 193; see also People v. Donoso, 908 N.Y.S.2d 667,
669-70 (App. Div. 2010) (“[N]ot all departures from the O’Rama procedure
constitute mode of proceedings error requiring reversal despite the lack of
preservation or prejudice to the defense.”).
80. People v. Starling, 650 N.E.2d 387, 391 (N.Y. 1995).
81. People v. Ochoa, 925 N.E.2d 868, 872 (N.Y. 2010); People v. Lykes, 609
N.E.2d 132, 133 (N.Y. 1993).
82. People v. Skinner, 611 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (App. Div. 1994).
83. People v. Martin, 808 N.Y.S.2d 865, 866 (App. Div. 2006), aff’d sub nom.
People v. Kisoon, 863 N.E.2d 990 (N.Y. 2007).
84. See People v. DeRosario, 611 N.E.2d 273, 275 (N.Y. 1993).
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Rather, application of the doctrine depends upon what the
oral question addresses. If the oral question follows the
same topic as the written question, where the attorneys had
input, the notice-and-opportunity requirement of O’Rama is
satisfied.85 But if the substantive scope of the oral question
varies from the written question, with no opportunity for
involvement by counsel, a mode of proceedings error occurs
since, at that point, “any input defense counsel had
proffered regarding the responses to the initial jury notes
did not suffice to satisfy the statute as to the subsequent
colloquies.”86
B. Judicial Delegation or Absence: Ahmed
The Court of Appeals has found mode of proceedings
error where the judge is absent during a portion of the trial.
Judicial absence87 or the delegation of judicial functions88
“deprive[s] the defendant of his right to a trial by jury, an
integral component of which is the supervision of a judge.” 89
Such supervision by a trial judge is a fundamental right.90

85. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 673, 675 (App. Div. 2008)
(“[T]he . . . oral question concerned an identical issue that had been raised in the
jury‟s written request.”).
86. DeRosario, 611 N.E.2d at 275; see also People v. Jones, 719 N.Y.S.2d 426,
427 (App. Div. 2000); People v. Boyne, 579 N.Y.S.2d 338, 340-41 (App. Div.
1992).
87. People v. Toliver, 675 N.E.2d 463, 464 (N.Y. 1996); People v. Pinkney, 709
N.Y.S.2d 10, 12 (App. Div. 2000).
88. People v. Ahmed, 487 N.E.2d 894, 894-95 (1985).
89. Id. For example, in People v. Stiggins, 802 N.E.2d 1081, 1082 (N.Y. 2003),
the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction where the judge “was unfamiliar
with the mechanics of a jury trial” and “had to be guided by the prosecutor
through every aspect of jury selection.” In People v. Brusie, 897 N.Y.S.2d 319,
320-21 (App. Div. 2010), the county court judge erred by delegating a hearing on
restitution to its court attorney. In People v. Bayes, 584 N.E.2d 643, 645 (N.Y.
1991), the judge permitted the attorneys to respond to jury questions. A mode
error was found: “The court‟s informal handling constituted a surrender of its
nondelegable judicial responsibility to supervise jury deliberation, which in
effect deprived defendant of his fundamental right to trial by jury and thereby
denied him a fair trial.” Id.
90. Toliver, 675 N.E.2d at 464.
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However, no such right has been recognized where the
judge was present, but inattentive.91
In People v. Ahmed, due to “a very bad throat and very
bad cold,” the trial judge had his law secretary read
requested instructions to the jury.92 The judge was present
for some of the instructions but absent for other requests.93
The judge‟s absence, as well as the delegation of
responsibility to the law secretary during deliberations, was
reversible error, despite a lack of preservation.94
A judge‟s instruction that nonjudicial personnel inform
a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating has been likened
to giving an Allen95 charge.96 Such a delegation of duties at a
“critical stage of the proceedings”97 has been faulted as a
mode of proceedings error.98 A judge may not delegate the
reading or explanation of the jury instructions to the
attorneys.99 But an instruction to the jury by nonjudicial
personnel to cease deliberating for the evening—in effect,
the opposite of an Allen charge—has been termed a
“ministerial” action, and not error, much less a mode of

91. People v. Degondea, 769 N.Y.S.2d 490, 501 (App. Div. 2003) (holding that
no fundamental right of the defendant to a trial by jury is violated by judicial
“somnolence” or inattention); see also People v. Tippins, 570 N.Y.S.2d 581, 58283 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that sleeping defense counsel was not ineffective).
While a juror who has not heard all the evidence is “grossly unqualified,” People
v. Simpkins, 792 N.Y.S.2d 170, 170 (App. Div. 2005), one difficulty with a
participant allegedly sleeping is that it may not be clear on the appellate record.
See People v. Fenderson, 611 N.Y.S.2d 220, 220 (App. Div. 1994).
92. Ahmed, 487 N.E.2d at 895.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). An Allen charge is a
supplemental jury instruction that urges a deadlocked jury to continue
deliberating. See People v. Aponte, 759 N.Y.S.2d 486, 489 (App. Div. 2003).
96. See People v. Bonaparte, 574 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (N.Y. 1991).
97. People v. Torres, 531 N.E.2d 635, 636 (N.Y. 1988).
98. Id.; People v. Johnson, 555 N.Y.S.2d 442, 442-43 (App. Div. 1990); People
v. Cooper, 551 N.Y.S.2d 254, 255 (App. Div. 1990); see also People v. Ciaccio, 391
N.E.2d 1347, 1349-50 (N.Y. 1979) (finding error even where the court clerk was
not instructed by the trial judge to communicate with jurors, and instead acted
independently).
99. People v. Bayes, 584 N.E.2d 643, 645 (N.Y. 1991).
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proceedings error.100 Where a communication to the jury is
“ministerial” in nature, the defendant does not need to be
present.101
A judge‟s absence during the performance of a delegable
duty, where the judge retains supervision and control of the
proceedings, does not require reversal. In People v.
Hernandez, the trial judge‟s absence during readback of
testimony, while disfavored, was not error.102 Similarly,
where the judge permitted jurors to examine exhibits in his
absence, the Court of Appeals found no mode error because
the viewings did not implicate the substantive role of the
judge in any way.103
C. Absence of Defendant or Defense Counsel: Mehmedi
A defendant has a due process104 as well as statutory
right105 to be present at trial. When the judge responds to a
jury note with instructions, the defendant‟s absence results
in a mode of proceedings error and requires reversal.106 In
People v. Mehmedi, the jury, during deliberations, sent out a
written question regarding the trial testimony.107 Instead of
having the jury return to the courtroom, the trial judge,
after consulting with counsel, sent a note back to the jury. 108
100. People v. Bonaparte, 574 N.E.2d 1027, 1028-30 (N.Y. 1991); see also
People v. Valle, 571 N.Y.S.2d 82, 83 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that court officer‟s
reminder to jury of judge‟s “admonitions,” which occurred outside the presence
of the defendant with defendant‟s consent, was ministerial and thus not a mode
error).
101. People v. Collins, 780 N.E.2d 499, 502 (N.Y. 2002); People v. Harris, 559
N.E.2d 660, 661-62 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Pichardo, 917 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766-68
(App. Div. 2010). What constitutes “ministerial” action can be subject to debate.
See Harris, 559 N.E.2d at 662-63 (Titone, J., dissenting).
102. People v. Hernandez, 729 N.E.2d 691, 692 (N.Y. 2000).
103. People v. Monroe, 688 N.E.2d 491, 492 (N.Y. 1997).
104. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934); People v. Ciaccio,
391 N.E.2d 1347, 1349 (N.Y. 1979).
105. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 2002).
106. People v. Mehmedi, 505 N.E.2d 610, 610-11 (N.Y. 1987); see also People v.
Wiemeier, 635 N.Y.S.2d 983, 985 (App. Div. 1995); People v. Jones, 553 N.Y.S.2d
37, 37 (App. Div. 1990); People v. Huarotte, 520 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758-60 (App. Div.
1987).
107. Mehmedi, 505 N.E.2d at 610.
108. Id.
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Defense counsel objected to the note‟s wording but failed to
object to the jury not being returned to the courtroom or to
the defendant‟s absence.109 By statute, however, the jury
must be returned and the defendant must be present.110 In
Mehmedi, noncompliance with the statute was a mode of
proceedings error; because the defendant was absent from a
material part of his trial, harmless error analysis was
inappropriate.111
The requirement that the defendant be present is
broader than the requirement that the judge be present. 112
In People v. Morton, the court refused the defendant‟s
request to be present while the jury viewed the crime
scene.113 The First Department ruled that the defendant had
the right to see what the jury saw and to view the reactions
of the individual jurors to the scene.114 Unlike Monroe,
where the Court of Appeals found no error because the
absence of the judge during the jury‟s viewing of exhibits
did not implicate the substantive role of the judge,115 in
Morton, the absence of the defendant during the jury‟s
viewing of the scene violated a statutory right, affecting the
mode of proceedings and requiring reversal.116
D. Court Jurisdiction: Correa
The subject-matter jurisdiction of a court is a
fundamental issue, well within mode of proceedings.117 The
109. Id.
110. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.30 (McKinney 2002).
111. Mehmedi, 505 N.E.2d at 611; see also People v. Vargas, 718 N.Y.S.2d 521,
522 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that defendant‟s right to be present during the
provision of supplemental instructions to jury, a “material stage of the trial,”
makes harmless error analysis inappropriate).
112. Compare People v. Morton, 596 N.Y.S.2d 783, 788 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t
1993), with People v. Monroe, 688 N.E.2d 491, 492 (N.Y. 1997).
113. Morton, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
114. Id. at 788.
115. Monroe, 688 N.E.2d at 492.
116. Morton, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 788 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.50
(McKinney 2002)).
117. People v. Bradner, 13 N.E. 87, 87-88 (N.Y. 1887); see also People v.
Shepherd, 500 N.E.2d 871, 872 (N.Y. 1986) (concerning geographical
jurisdiction). In Shepherd, the town court could not conduct a hearing outside
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Court of Appeals addressed this issue with the concept of
“problem solving courts” promoted by former Chief Judge
Judith S. Kaye.118 Specifically, the issue arose with the
jurisdiction of different courts in New York City: the Bronx
Criminal Division (“BCD”) of Supreme Court and the
Integrated Domestic Violence Part (“IDV”) of Supreme
Court in Queens. In three Appellate Division decisions
handed down close in time to each other, the First and
Second Departments split on whether these courts, set up
by the Unified Court System (“UCS”) rather than by the
state legislature, had jurisdiction to authorize transfer of
cases from local criminal courts in New York City to
Supreme Court for trial.119
None of the defendants had challenged jurisdiction at
the trial level; after the filing of briefs in the First
Department, the Appellate Division sua sponte requested
the attorneys to brief additional issues relating to
jurisdiction.120 The Second Department found no mode of
proceedings error with the courts set up by UCS.121 The

the town, though the prosecution consented to it: "[The] jurisdictional limitation
. . . is not susceptible to waiver." Id.
118. See Statewide Symposium Focuses on Problem-Solving Courts, 1
PROBLEM S OLVING C OURTS (N.Y.S. Office of Ct. Admin., New York, N.Y.), no.
1, at 1, available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/problem_solving/
PSCNewsletter_07-08.pdf.
119. People v. Correa, 897 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t) (jurisdiction
did not exist), aff’d, 933 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 2010); People v. Mack, 893 N.Y.S.2d
871, 871-72 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t) (jurisdiction did not exist), rev’d sub nom.
People v. Correa, 933 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 2010); People v. Fernandez, 897
N.Y.S.2d 158, 164, 166 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2010) (jurisdiction did exist), aff’d
sub nom. People v. Correa, 933 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 2010).
120. The First Department requested briefing on:
(1) whether the establishment of the [Criminal Division of the Supreme
Court in Bronx County] under Part 142 of the Rules of the Chief
Administrator of the Courts is consistent with the constitution and
statutes of the State of New York; and (2) whether the Supreme Court
possesses jurisdiction over a criminal case absent the filing of an
indictment or superior court information as specified in [Criminal
Procedure Law section] 210.05.
Correa, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17.
121. Fernandez, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
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First Department went the other way, with one justice
dissenting strongly.122
At the Court of Appeals, Judge Graffeo wrote for a
unanimous court on both the First and Second Department
decisions.123 She framed the issue:
If Supreme Court—acting through the IDV Part or the BCD—did
not possess the authority to conduct these proceedings, this would
be a fundamental, nonwaivable defect in the mode of proceedings
that could be raised by defendants on their direct appeal despite
124
their failure to comply with preservation requirements.

The Court of Appeals found that the courts were properly
set up via administrative rule by the UCS and affirmed the
convictions.125
The Court of Appeals addressed another transfer case in
People v. Wilson, decided the same day as People v.
Correa.126 The defendant‟s misdemeanor case was
transferred from New York City Criminal Court to Supreme
Court, where she was tried and convicted based on a
misdemeanor information rather than an indictment or
superior court information.127 Her contention that the trial
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction was considered on
appeal, despite lack of preservation, but the conviction was
affirmed: “Supreme Court possesses concurrent subject
matter jurisdiction over the trial of unindicted misdemeanor
offenses.”128 The defendant argued that when she was
convicted, the court rules that created the Criminal Division
of the Supreme Court in Bronx County were not yet in
place.129 The Court of Appeals found this to be “the

122. Correa, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 26-34.
123. People v. Correa, 933 N.E.2d 705, 707, 718 (N.Y. 2010). Chief Judge
Lippman, who was Chief Administrative Judge when the administrative rules
were promulgated, did not participate. Id. at 718.
124. Id. at 710 (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 710-11.
126. People v. Wilson, 931 N.E.2d 69, 69-70 (N.Y. 2010).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 70.
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equivalent of an improper venue claim, which is not
jurisdictional in nature and is waived if not timely raised.”130
One Appellate Division case seemingly diverges from
Correa and Wilson. In People v. Adams, the defendant
pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges in county court by
superior court information.131 The case was removed to
supreme court without authorization by the Chief
Administrator.132 The Fourth Department held that the
county court judge, as Acting Supreme Court Justice, “had
no authority to preside over sentencing, rendering the
sentence illegal.”133 The case was remitted to county court
for resentencing.134 Decided fifteen days after Correa and
Wilson, the Adams decision vacated and remitted for
resentencing a conviction based on an unpreserved error,
without terming it mode of proceedings error.135 The Fourth
Department has since distinguished Adams, finding
subsequent transfer issues to be in the nature of venue
objections that were unpreserved and hence waived.136
The New York court system has long been hobbled by
artificial distinctions in the types of courts it has, although
a proposed merger in the state court system has been
regularly defeated.137 Future decisions may focus on
concerns addressed in Correa and Wilson, just as many
appeals now address O’Rama-related issues.

130. Id. (citation omitted).
131. People v. Adams, 906 N.Y.S.2d 832, 832 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2010).
132. Id. at 832-33; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 200.14
(1995) (permitting transfers of indictments between the county court and the
supreme court “upon authorization by the Chief Administrator”).
133. Adams, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. People v. Ott, 921 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451-52 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2011) (citing
People v. Correa, 933 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 2010)); see also People v. Wilson, 931
N.E.2d 69, 70 (N.Y. 2010) (holding that transfer from New York City Criminal
Court to Supreme Court was akin to an “improper venue claim” and was waived
because not raised).
137. See, e.g., Frank Lynn, Court Merger Seen as Dead in Legislature, N.Y.
TIMES , June 8, 1987, at B1.
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The Court of Appeals has also addressed mode of
proceedings arguments in the context of double jeopardy.138
In the more common situation of the successive prosecution
form of double jeopardy, preservation is required and no
mode of proceedings error occurs because it is not an error
of the court lacking jurisdiction.139 In the successive or
increased punishment form of double jeopardy, mode of
proceedings is violated when the trial court attempts to
adjust a sentence once the defendant has attained a
legitimate expectation of finality of the sentence.140
E. Jury Instructions
With faulty jury instructions, courts have usually
rejected any mode of proceedings error and instead required
preservation.141 For example, instructing the jury before the
court is statutorily required to do so has been rejected as a
mode error.142 The preservation requirement has also been
required with the most basic of jury instructions, that of
omitting an instruction on the presumption of innocence.143
138. See People v. Williams, 925 N.E.2d 878, 892 (N.Y. 2010); see also People
v. Michael, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 (N.Y. 1979) (“The State‟s legitimate interests
are not seriously touched by allowing a constitutional double jeopardy claim to
be raised for the first time on appeal, since such a claim, even if successful, will
not result in repeated proceedings, as it is the very essence of a successful
double jeopardy defense that there are no further proceedings. Similarly, there
will be no need for any additional factual findings in such cases, as such a
defense is made out from the record of the prior proceedings and entails no
factual inquiry. Finally, double jeopardy does not constitute the type of error
which can be remedied so as to allow the trial to proceed in accordance with law
if it is timely raised, for such a defense, if valid, is simply not correctable.”).
139. People v. Biggs, 803 N.E.2d 370, 374 (N.Y. 2003).
140. Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 890-92.
141. People v. McKenzie, 490 N.E.2d 842, 843-44 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Hoyle,
820 N.Y.S.2d 527, 527 (App. Div. 2006); People v. Beaudoin, 603 N.Y.S.2d 926
927-28 (App. Div. 1993).
142. People v. Brown, 860 N.E.2d 55, 55 (N.Y. 2006). But see People v. Fujah,
582 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that a mode error occurred, and
the defendant was entitled to a new trial, when the court began charging the
jury before summation).
143. People v. Creech, 458 N.E.2d 1249, 1250 (N.Y. 1983). Another rather
basic issue, legal sufficiency of evidence presented at trial, also requires
preservation. People v. Udzinski, 541 N.Y.S.2d 9, 13 (App. Div. 1989) (“The
preservation doctrine has been extended so far as to preclude appellate review,
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In Patterson, the Court of Appeals stated: “If the burden
of proof was improperly placed upon the defendant,
defendant was deprived of a properly conducted trial, the
distribution of the burden of persuasion [of an affirmative
defense] being just as significant as the proper composition
of the jury.”144 On the facts presented, however, placing the
burden on the defendant was found proper.145 Thus, the
mode language of Patterson is dictum. Yet nine years later,
Ahmed included it in a list of mode errors.146
Accordingly, a jury instruction that expressly shifts the
burden of proof may be one jury instruction that constitutes
a mode of proceedings error. The Third Department held
that it was mode of proceedings error when the trial court
failed to instruct the jury on the elements of the charged
crime and instead instructed the jury on elements of
another crime.147 However, incorrect jury instructions on the
presumption of innocence,148 jury instructions that are
merely susceptible to an interpretation that the burden of
proof is shifted,149 jury instructions on credibility,
identification, and acting in concert,150 and the incorrect
definition of an element,151 all require preservation.
In one pre-Patterson case, the Court of Appeals, citing
Cancemi, held that a judge‟s improper comment on the
defendant‟s failure to testify required reversal despite a lack
as a matter of law, of what could convincingly be said to be the most
fundamental of all possible defects in a criminal proceeding, that is, the failure
of the People to adduce legally sufficient evidence of the crime of which the
defendant is convicted.” (citations omitted)); see also People v. Gray, 652 N.E.2d
919, 923 (N.Y. 1995). Where there are omissions in the jury charge, an
intermediate appellate court may exercise its interest of justice review. See
People v. Cotterell, 779 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501 (App. Div. 2004).
144. People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 903 (N.Y. 1976), aff’d, 432 U.S. 197
(1977).
145. Id. at 908.
146. People v. Ahmed, 487 N.E.2d 894, 895 (N.Y. 1985).
147. People v. Rose, 879 N.Y.S.2d 852, 853 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 2009).
148. People v. Creech, 458 N.E.2d 1249, 1250 (N.Y. 1983).
149. People v. McKenzie, 490 N.E.2d 842, 843-44 (N.Y. 1986); People v.
Beaudoin, 603 N.Y.S.2d 926, 927-28 (App. Div. 1993).
150. People v. Hoyle, 820 N.Y.S.2d 527, 527 (App. Div. 2006).
151. People v. Udzinski, 541 N.Y.S.2d 9, 13-14 (App. Div. 1989).
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of preservation.152 However, inquiry by the judge outside the
jury‟s presence concerning the admissibility of evidence153
and innocuous remarks by a judge other than the trial
judge,154 require preservation.
The inclusion of improper language on a verdict sheet
may be a mode of proceedings error.155 But, this does not
apply to the addition of lesser counts to be considered by the
jury in the alternative when the jury has not been orally
charged with those lesser counts.156
Furthermore, rule violations that do not bear upon a
constitutional or statutory right are not mode of proceedings
errors, including granting the jury‟s note-taking request
mid-trial,157 delegation of ministerial tasks, such as the
prosecutor‟s replaying of a videotape machine for the jurors
in open court158 and the unsupervised demonstration of a
weapon‟s operation by nonjudicial personnel.159
The Court of Appeals also rejected mode of proceedings
arguments in cases that challenged the constitutionality of
152. People v. McLucas, 204 N.E.2d 846, 847-48 (N.Y. 1965) (citing Cancemi v.
People, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858)). But see Udzinski, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12 (“The
preservation doctrine has been applied so as to preclude appellate review of a
wide variety of arguments relating to errors which clearly affected fundamental
rights.”).
153. People v. Rivera, 739 N.Y.S.2d 566, 566 (App. Div. 2002).
154. People v. Henriquez, 625 N.Y.S.2d 526, 527 (App. Div. 1995).
155. People v. Miller, 901 N.Y.S.2d 444, 445 (App. Div. 2010); see also People v.
Collins, 780 N.E.2d 499, 501-02 (N.Y. 2002) (“[S]ubmission of a verdict sheet
that lists statutory elements without the defendant‟s consent, or the court‟s
response to a jury‟s request for a clarification of testimony—affects the mode of
proceedings prescribed by law.” (citations omitted)); People v. Johnson, 930
N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (2011) (holding that submission of annotated verdict sheet
without defense counsel‟s consent was error).
156. Collins, 780 N.E.2d at 502.
157. People v. Canty, 916 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81 (App. Div. 2011) (“There was
nothing even approaching a mode of proceedings error that „went to the
essential validity of the process and was so fundamental that the entire trial is
irreparably tainted.‟” (quoting People v. Brown, 860 N.E.2d 55, 55 (N.Y. 2006)));
People v. Valiente, 765 N.E.2d 503, 504 (App. Div. 2003); see also N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 220.10 (2001).
158. People v. Mays, 925 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759 (App. Div. 2011); People v. Davis,
687 N.Y.S.2d 803, 806-07 (App. Div. 1999).
159. People v. Kelly, 832 N.E.2d 1179, 1181-82 (N.Y. 2005).
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New York‟s discretionary persistent felony offender
sentencing statute160 and the mandatory persistent violent
felony offender statute.161 In People v. Rosen, the defense
unsuccessfully argued that the defendant was entitled to
have his previous convictions, which increased his potential
sentencing exposure, placed before a jury, based on
Apprendi v. New Jersey.162 Although the issue of the
constitutionality of New York‟s persistent felony offender
statute appears settled, Chief Judge Lippman has argued
that it unconstitutionally denies “a criminal defendant‟s
right to have each and every element necessary to
imposition of the authorized punishment proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt,” thus violating the mode of
proceedings prescribed by law.163 The issue itself was
rejected on the merits, in addition to being unpreserved.164
Such an argument is particularly difficult to raise for the
first time on appeal, as New York law requires that a
constitutional challenge to a statute be on notice to the
Attorney General, raised at the trial level.165
160. People v. Rosen, 752 N.E.2d 844, 847 (N.Y. 2001); see also Portalatin v.
Graham, 624 F.3d 69, 92-94 (2d Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1693 (2011); People v. Quinones, 906 N.E.2d 1033, 1040-42 (N.Y. 2009).
161. See People v. Battles, 942 N.E.2d 1026, 1028-29 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied,
No. 10-9465, 2011 WL 4530495 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011).
162. Rosen, 752 N.E.2d at 846 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000)).
163. Battles, 942 N.E.2d at 1034 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting) (“There can be no
more pronounced a departure from the mode of proceedings prescribed by law
than the denial of a criminal defendant‟s right to have each and every element
necessary to imposition of the authorized punishment proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.”); see also People v. Fuller, 441 N.E.2d 563, 565 (N.Y. 1982)
(“[T]he „essential nature‟ of the right to be sentenced as provided by law, though
not formally raised at the trial level, preserves a departure therefrom for review
in [the Court of Appeals].”).
164. Battles, 942 N.E.2d at 1028-29 (majority opinion).
165. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 71 (McKinney 2010); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1012(b) (McKinney
Supp. 2011); see also Gardner v. Continuing Developmental Servs., Inc., 739
N.Y.S.2d 302, 302 (App. Div. 2002) (rejecting plaintiff‟s constitutional challenge
to a section of the New York Labor Law because plaintiff raised the issue for the
first time on appeal); People v. Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc., 846 N.E.2d 457,
460 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that a defendant may not claim for the first time on
appeal that a statute is unconstitutionally vague, even if such a finding by the
court would render the accusatory instrument facially insufficient and thus
would not require preservation).
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F. Sequestration: Coons Error and Webb Waiver
Changes in the law have brought into question some of
the most seminal and important mode of proceedings
decisions. One example is jury sequestration.166 In a rather
short decision in 1990,167 People v. Coons, the Court of
Appeals held that the sequestration rule contained in
section 310.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law was violated
where the trial judge “permitted the jurors to go to their
homes for dinner, separately and unsupervised.”168 Such
errors “need not be preserved and, even if acceded to, still
present a question of law for this court to review.”169
The next year, the holding in Coons was essentially
neutralized in People v. Webb.170 The trial judge had
permitted jurors to go home overnight separately and
unsupervised.171 The Court of Appeals framed the issue as
“whether a defendant may waive the sequestration
requirement,” which it stated had not been decided in
Coons.172 The defendant in Coons, unlike the defendant in
Webb, “had not consented to the procedure.”173 Thus, the
issue in Webb was different: “[W]hether the sequestration
requirement in CPL 310.10 may be effectively waived when,
as in the case before us, the defendant has been informed of
his rights by counsel and expressly consents on the record
in the presence of counsel to the departure from the
statute.”174
166. Another, the state constitutional requirement of a twelve-person jury
with an indictment, is discussed below. See infra Part III.I.
167. It may be fair to say that no decision on mode of proceedings has
examined the issue at length. Perhaps the longest cited in this article, People v.
Udzinski, 541 N.Y.S.2d 9 (App. Div. 1989), focused more on the preservation
rule. See supra notes 151-52.
168. People v. Coons, 551 N.E.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. 1990) (“[A] deliberating jury
„must be continuously kept together under the supervision of a court officer.‟”
(quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.10 (McKinney 2002))).
169. Id. (citations omitted).
170. 581 N.E.2d 509, 510-12 (N.Y. 1991).
171. Id. at 510.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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The Court of Appeals summarized the defense position
in Webb as follows:
[B]ecause the sequestration requirement has been held to be
sufficiently linked to the mode of proceedings so as not to require
preservation (see, People v. Coons, supra), it follows that the
requirement is not waivable. The argument equates an error
which does not require an objection for preservation with an error
which necessarily entails a part of the process so essential to the
form and conduct of the actual trial that the defendant may not
waive it. In other words, what need not be preserved may not be
175
waived.

The Webb court pointed out that while waiver and
preservation are often “inextricably intertwined,” they are
“separate concepts.”176 The court proceeded to “address the
waivability of the claimed error as an issue that is separate
and distinct from the question of preservation.”177
Distinguishing both judicial delegation in Ahmed and lessthan-twelve jurors in Cancemi from Webb, Judge Hancock
stated that “the sequestration provision does not implicate
fundamental rights that are an integral part of the trial
itself.”178 Both Ahmed and Cancemi had “involved the
defendant‟s common-law and constitutionally based right to
a jury trial.”179 In contrast, the sequestration requirement
“is entirely statutory and reflects no established commonlaw right of the defendant. . . . Thus, we conclude that the
sequestration requirement does not entail a right of
defendant that is so essential to the trial proceeding that it
may never be waived.”180
Webb made a seeming distinction between a right long
recognized by tradition versus one that is entirely
175. Id. at 510-11. The court concluded that this position “is contrary to our
decisions.” Id. at 511.
176. Id. at 511 (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The finding of waiver in Webb may have been influenced by a Second
Department decision on jury sequestration that had distinguished Coons by
applying waiver analysis, though it was not cited in Webb. People v. D‟Alvia, 575
N.Y.S.2d 495, 501-03 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1991). D’Alvia was decided on
September 30, 1991, id. at 495, Webb on October 15, 1991. Webb, 581 N.E.2d at
509.
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statutorily based. This insertion of common law181 into mode
of proceedings analysis implied that common-law or longheld rights were more important than statutes or
constitutions in discerning what is truly “fundamental” so
as to come within mode of proceedings.182 Thus, there
appears to be two layers of issues that may come within the
doctrine.
The Court of Appeals‟ shift away from Coons error, and
toward Webb waiver, is consistent with other caselaw that
almost always treats jury-related procedural errors as not
violating the mode of proceedings doctrine, absent some
nexus with the defendant or the charged crime. For
example, in an early case, the Court of Appeals
distinguished Cancemi and held that when there was a
formal irregularity during the process by which jurors were
drawn, “any irregularity which would be ground of error . . .
was merely formal, affecting no public interest, trenching
upon no public policy” and could therefore be waived by the
defendant.183
Appellate decisions have found that errors affecting the
composition of the jury are outside the mode of proceedings
doctrine. Examples not requiring reversal include excusing
a juror who lacked statutorily-mandated property
qualifications,184 a clerk‟s error in counting peremptory
challenges,185 and improperly discharging a sworn juror.186
The use by a judge of a pre-screening procedure for
prospective jurors was likewise found not to violate the
mode of proceedings by the First Department in People v.
Casanova.187
181. See People v. Michael, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 1136 (N.Y. 1979) (“[T]here exist
certain rules of law, be they founded on the common law, prescribed by statute,
or mandated by or [sic] Constitutions, which are so basic to the validity of a
criminal proceeding that the failure to observe such a rule may be raised at any
time during the appellate process.”).
182. See, e.g., People v. Becoats, 2011 N.Y. Slip. Op. 07306, at *3, 2011 WL
4972341 (N.Y. Oct. 20, 2011) (“That term [mode of proceedings] is reserved for
the most fundamental flaws.”).
183. Pierson v. People, 79 N.Y. 424, 432 (1880).
184. People v. Cosmo, 98 N.E. 408, 410-12 (N.Y. 1912).
185. People v. Mathis, 708 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (App. Div. 2000).
186. People v. Powell, 913 N.Y.S.2d 468, 469 (App. Div. 2010).
187. 875 N.Y.S.2d 31, 32-34 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2009).
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As Casanova and other cases suggest, even improper
contact between the judge and jury is insufficient to violate
the mode of proceedings prescribed by law. In a case
involving dual juries, failing to seal the first jury‟s verdict
until the second verdict was returned did not amount to a
violation of mode of proceedings.188 In camera questioning of
jurors was held not to be mode error,189 nor was the
inclusion of the judge‟s spouse as a juror.190 The failure to
remove a seated juror during a mistrial inquiry was also
held to require preservation.191 And where the judge
adequately, but not completely, admonished the jury before
recessing for the night, preservation was required.192 In all
of these cases there were errors that affected the jury.
However, with no nexus between the jury-related error and
the defendant or the charged crime, the Court of Appeals
seems unlikely to find a violation of the defendant‟s
fundamental rights that would result in mode of
proceedings error.
G. Alternate Jurors: Agramonte
Jury sequestration is closely entwined with what
happens with alternate jurors, because by statute, alternate
jurors are to be kept “separate and apart from the regular
jurors” during deliberations.193 An issue involving alternate
jurors arose in People v Agramonte.194 The trial court had
permitted the alternate jurors to dine with regular jurors
after deliberations had commenced.195 In upholding the
conviction, the Court of Appeals again supported the
188. People v. Irizarry, 634 N.E.2d 179, 180-82 (N.Y. 1994).
189. People v. Rios, 587 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (App. Div. 1992).
190. People v. Hartson, 553 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538-39 (App. Div. 1990). Although
not found to be a mode error, “this is one of those rare cases necessitating the
exercise of the discretion entrusted to us to reverse the judgment of conviction in
the interest of justice.” Id. at 539 (citation omitted).
191. People v. Yong Yun Lee, 706 N.E.2d 1185, 1186 (N.Y. 1998).
192. People v. Edwards, 891 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (App. Div. 2010); see also
People v. Williams, 846 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (App. Div. 2007) (citing N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW §§ 270.40, 310.10 (McKinney 2002)).
193. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.30(1) (McKinney 2002).
194. 665 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1996).
195. Id. at 165.
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apparent “two layers of fundamental rights” error analysis
for mode of proceedings cases,196 italicizing the difference in
the types of errors: “Only fundamental defects in judicial
proceedings, however, fall within this very narrow category
of so-called „mode of proceedings‟ errors.”197 And quoting
Webb: “[T]he sequestration provision does not implicate
fundamental rights that are an integral part of the trial
itself.”198
As the court in Agramonte concluded, “[o]ur holding in
[Webb] thus leads to the inescapable conclusion that
violations of the sequestration provision do not fall within
the „one very narrow exception to the requirement of a
timely objection.‟”199 Violation of the statutory “separate and
apart” requirement for alternate jurors was not a mode of
proceedings error, but one requiring preservation.200
Webb and Agramonte did not explicitly overrule Coons
but effectively limited sequestration as a mode of
proceedings error: Coons was last cited by the Court of
Appeals in 1996 in Agramonte,201 and by the Appellate
Division in 1998, in a dissent.202 Another reason for the
decline of sequestration as a mode error may be the
legislative amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law, as
noted in Agramonte, “granting the trial court discretion to
dispense with sequestration in certain classes of cases.”203
196. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
197. Agramonte, 665 N.E.2d at 166 (citations omitted).
198. Id. (quoting People v. Webb, 581 N.E.2d 509, 511 (N.Y. 1991)).
199. Id. (quoting People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 902 (1976), aff’d, 432
U.S. 197 (1977)).
200. Id. at 167.
201. Id. at 166-67.
202. People v. Anderson, 671 N.Y.S.2d 149, 151 (App. Div. 1998) (Ritter, J.,
dissenting). Other sequestration-related errors may arise that violate the mode
doctrine, however.
203. Agramonte, 665 N.E.2d at 166 n. With N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.10(1)
as currently written, “discretion to dispense with sequestration now may be
used in any case, after notice to the parties and affording an opportunity to be
heard on the record outside of the presence of the jury.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
310.10 practice cmt. (McKinney 2002). The Practice Commentary further notes,
“[t]he provisions of subdivision one need not be interpreted literally, as they are
not deemed a fundamental aspect of the proper mode of judicial proceedings.”
Id.
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H. Accusatory Instruments: Boston and Casey
Under the New York State Constitution, a defendant
charged with a felony has the right to be prosecuted by
indictment.204 In 1974, the state constitution was amended
so as to allow the waiver of indictment process, and article
195 of the Criminal Procedure Law, entitled “Waiver of
Indictment,” was thereafter enacted.205 A superior court
information is used when a defendant bypasses the grand
jury process and waives indictment.206 It is almost always
employed only where there is an agreement for the
defendant to plead guilty. Caselaw has required close
adherence to article 195: in People v. Boston, the Court of
Appeals recognized nonadherence to the waiver of
indictment process as a mode of proceedings error.207
The inclusion of hearsay in a misdemeanor information
is another mode of proceedings issue. With prosecutions of
lesser charges, the accusatory instruments usually
employed are either a misdemeanor complaint or a
misdemeanor information. The requirements for these
accusatory instruments are set forth in detail in the
Criminal Procedure Law.208 A misdemeanor complaint may
commence a criminal proceeding but is normally insufficient
204. N.Y. CONST . art. I, § 6.
205. Id.; 1974 N.Y. Sess. Laws 613, 614 (McKinney); see People v. Banville,
523 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847-48 (App. Div. 1988).
206. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.15 practice cmt. (McKinney 2007).
207. People v. Boston, 554 N.E.2d 64, 67 n.2 (N.Y. 1990); see also People v.
Pierce, 930 N.E.2d 176, 183 (N.Y. 2010); People v. Feliz, 887 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49-50
(App. Div. 2009); People v. Martoken, 845 N.Y.S.2d 460, 461 (App. Div. 2007).
For example, in People v. Zanghi, 588 N.E.2d 77, 78 (N.Y. 1991), where the
defendant pleaded guilty via waiver of indictment to a higher charge than he
had been charged with previously, the conviction was reversed:
As a threshold matter, since an infringement of defendant‟s right to be
prosecuted only by indictment implicates the jurisdiction of the court,
the claim may be reviewed even though defendant did not object to
being prosecuted on the information he now claims was defective and,
in fact, consented to be prosecuted on it. Further, because it is
jurisdictional, an infringement upon the right to be prosecuted by
indictment is not waived by the entry of a guilty plea.
Id. (citations omitted).
208. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 100.10, 100.15, 100.30, 100.45 (McKinney
2004).
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for trial;209 in contrast, a misdemeanor information is a trialready instrument that must contain “non-hearsay
allegations [that] establish, if true, every element of the
offense charged and the defendant‟s commission thereof.”210
In People v. Casey, the defendant failed to challenge the
misdemeanor information that charged him with criminal
contempt in the second degree at the trial level.211 The
information contained no non-hearsay allegation of
defendant‟s physical receipt of a temporary order of
protection.212 He first raised the issue upon appeal, after
being convicted at jury trial.213 The Appellate Term affirmed
the conviction, finding that by waiving the reading of his
procedural rights, defendant had also waived the right to be
prosecuted by information.214 On further appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the conviction but under a different
analysis.215 Defendant had waived only a reading of the
information, not the right to be charged by information.216
Writing for the court, Judge Levine made a clear
distinction between those errors in an accusatory
instrument that are jurisdictional in nature and
209. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.10(4)(d) (McKinney 2007). If arraigned on
a misdemeanor complaint, the judge must inform the defendant that he “may
not be prosecuted thereon or required to enter a plea thereto unless he consents
to the same, and that in the absence of such consent such misdemeanor
complaint will for prosecution purposes have to be replaced and superseded by
an information.” Id. A defendant charged by misdemeanor complaint “may
waive prosecution by information and consent to be prosecuted upon the
misdemeanor complaint.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.65(3) (McKinney 2007).
210. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c); see also People v. Kalin, 906 N.E.2d
381, 382-83 (N.Y. 2009) (“The usual instrument filed to obtain jurisdiction over
an accused for a misdemeanor offense is a misdemeanor complaint. . . . A
misdemeanor complaint, however, may not serve as the basis for a prosecution
unless the accused expressly waives the right to be prosecuted by a
misdemeanor information. . . . In addition to the reasonable cause requirement,
an information must also set forth „nonhearsay allegations‟ which, if true,
establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant‟s commission
thereof.” (internal citations omitted)).
211. People v. Casey, 698 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (App. Term 1999).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. People v. Casey, 740 N.E.2d 233, 235 (N.Y. 2000).
216. Id.
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“nonwaivable” and those that are pleading defects. 217 In the
former category are those “fundamental” errors where an
element is omitted because they “impair a defendant‟s basic
rights to fair notice sufficient to enable preparation of a
defense and to prevent double jeopardy.”218 According to the
court, “[h]earsay pleading defects do not implicate any of
those basic rights of an accused,” and so “[t]he inclusion of
hearsay allegations in a local court information cannot
deprive the tribunal of subject-matter jurisdiction.”219 The
court continued, “[p]leading deficiencies cannot be
jurisdictional because a court must both have and exercise
subject-matter jurisdiction in order even to rule on the
sufficiency of a pleading.”220 In finding hearsay allegations
in a misdemeanor information to not be a mode of
proceedings error, the Casey court distinguished earlier
decisions in which “there was a total absence of pleading of
one of the elements of the crime.”221
In a later appeal, People v. Keizer, the Court of Appeals
summarized the holding in Casey by stating “hearsay
defects did not fit within the narrow exceptions to the
preservation rule created by this court‟s precedents: hearsay
defects are neither subject-matter violations nor mode of
proceedings
errors,
neither
of
which
requires
preservation.”222 In Keizer, the jurisdictional sufficiency of
an accusatory instrument was challenged where a guilty
plea had been entered.223 The court wrote:
217. Id. at 239-40.
218. Id. at 240.
219. Id.
220. Id. (citation omitted).
221. Id. at 237 (citing People v. Alejandro, 511 N.E.2d 71, 72-73 (N.Y. 1987));
see also People v. Jones, 878 N.E.2d 1016, 1018-19 (N.Y. 2007).
222. People v. Keizer, 790 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (N.Y. 2003). The defendants in
Keizer forfeited their claims of defective accusatory instruments by pleading
guilty. Id. at 1152, 1155. A guilty plea to disorderly conduct, an offense not
charged in the complaint, was valid. Id. at 1151-52. But the court in Casey noted
that hearsay pleading defects in juvenile delinquency petitions are jurisdictional
in nature. Casey, 740 N.E.2d at 240-41. A “removal order” in a juvenile offender
prosecution, from criminal court to family court, which contained only hearsay
allegations, was nonwaivable and could be raised on appeal, despite lack of
preservation. In re Michael M., 821 N.E.2d 537, 538 (N.Y. 2004).
223. Keizer, 790 N.E.2d at 1151.
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The present case presents a variant of the question posed in Casey
where we held that an objection to a purported hearsay defect in
an accusatory instrument must be preserved for appeal purposes
by raising the objection in the first instance at the trial court. In
the present case, the question is whether a defendant‟s claim of a
nonjurisdictional hearsay defect in the accusatory instrument
raised at the trial court survives a guilty plea. We conclude that it
224
does not.

The distinguishing factor in Keizer was not that it was a
guilty plea; in a later case, where a defendant pleaded
guilty to a charge that was not in the indictment and not a
lesser included offense, the plea was found jurisdictionally
defective.225
I. Waiver of Twelve-Person Jury: Gajadhar
The “two levels of fundamental rights” for mode of
proceedings analysis was further developed in People v.
Gajadhar, which involved an eleven-member jury in a
murder trial.226 The first case to articulate mode of
proceedings, Cancemi v. People, involved an attempted
waiver of a jury of twelve.227 However, in Gajadhar the
Court of Appeals reached an outcome different from that in
Cancemi because the state constitution had been amended
during the intervening years.228
The New York State Constitution provides that “crimes
prosecuted by indictment shall be tried by a jury composed
of twelve persons, unless a jury trial has been waived as
provided in section two of article one of this constitution.”229
That section of the constitution provides, in part:

224. Id. at 1154.
225. People v. Castillo, 868 N.E.2d 185, 185-86 (N.Y. 2007).
226. 880 N.E.2d 863, 864 (N.Y. 2007).
227. 18 N.Y. 128, 131 (1858).
228. Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 868-69.
229. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor has a
right to a jury trial of six jurors, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 360.10(1) (McKinney
2005), except where a defendant in New York City Criminal Court is charged by
information and the highest charge is a class B misdemeanor. N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 340.40(2) (McKinney 2005).
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A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases,
except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by
death, by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person
in open court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of
a court having jurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may
enact laws, not inconsistent herewith, governing the form,
content, manner and time of presentation of the instrument
230
effectuating such waiver.

The defendant in Gajadhar was charged with seven
felonies, including second degree murder.231 Alternate jurors
were dismissed at the beginning of deliberations, the
defendant having informed the court that, should a regular
juror become unavailable during deliberations, he would not
consent to an alternate being substituted.232 After
deliberations began, one juror became ill.233 According to
Judge Graffeo, the parties were aware that due to the
location of witnesses, obtaining a retrial would be
“burdensome.”234 Opposing a mistrial, defendant asked that
deliberations continue with the remaining eleven jurors,
and executed a written waiver in open court.235 The trial
judge granted the waiver, despite the constitutional
requirement of a twelve-person jury.236 The trial judge
acknowledged Cancemi, but noted that the state
constitution‟s language had changed since 1858.237 The
defendant was convicted of second degree felony-murder
and first degree robbery, receiving a prison sentence of
twenty years to life.238
230. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.10 (McKinney
2002). Consent must be in written form; oral consent, on the record, is
insufficient and will result in mode of proceedings error. People v. Garbutt, 839
N.Y.S.2d 833, 834 (App. Div. 2007).
231. Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 864-65.
232. Id. at 864. Under N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35(1) (McKinney 2002),
once jury deliberations have begun, substitution of an alternate juror requires a
defendant‟s written consent in open court.
233. Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 864.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. People v. Gajadhar, 753 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311-12 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
237. Id. at 312-13.
238. Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 864-65.
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The conviction was affirmed both at the Appellate
Division239 and at the Court of Appeals.240 “There is no doubt
that Cancemi was decided correctly in 1858,” wrote Judge
Graffeo, noting that at that time jury waivers were
permitted only in civil cases.241 “Conversely, the constitution
did not allow criminal defendants to waive the right to a
jury trial, which meant that defendants could not consent to
jury deliberations by less than twelve jurors.”242 Since then,
amendments in 1938 to the state constitution “clearly
dispelled the notion that a defendant cannot consent to an
alteration of the common-law jury of twelve in a noncapital
criminal case.”243
While long-held rights had been given prominence in
Agramonte for purposes of mode of proceedings analysis,
this was downplayed by the majority in Gajadhar, which
acknowledged the long history of a jury composed of twelve
people, but commented on the talismanic quality of the
number of jurors being twelve.244
In dissent, Judge Ciparick, joined by Chief Judge Kaye,
argued for the continued vitality of the twelve-juror
requirement.245 While defendants may waive fundamental
constitutional rights:
[T]hese rights cannot be characterized as fundamental “to the
organization of the tribunals or the mode of proceeding prescribed
by the constitution and the laws.” Because the right to be tried by
12 persons is fundamental to the mode of proceeding and not
239. People v. Gajadhar, 828 N.Y.S.2d 346, 354 (App. Div. 2007).
240. Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 870.
241. Id. at 868.
242. Id. (citation omitted).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 865. The court wrote:
The number 12 has long been associated with trial by jury but no one
knows why or when the common law settled on that figure. Some legal
commentators speculate that the number has religious significance. It
has also been said that a jury of 12 evolved from certain ancient
practices, such as convening 12 individuals with knowledge of a
disputed matter . . . . Regardless of origin, the number 12 was
eventually regarded with “superstitious reverence.”
Id. (citations omitted).
245. Id. at 870 (Ciparick, J., dissenting).
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personal to a defendant, it is distinguishable from the other rights
246
that we have permitted a criminal defendant to waive.

The dissent asserted that “[t]he right to be tried by a jury of
12—unless waived in favor of a bench trial—is inviolate and
cannot be waived.247
The reasoning by the Court of Appeals in Gajadhar is
inconsistent with its reasoning in People v. Boston.
Although the New York Constitution was amended to allow
for waiver of indictment, the court in Boston held that
deviation from the statutory waiver procedures results in a
mode of proceedings error.248 By this reasoning, where the
constitution is amended to allow a defendant to waive a
“fundamental” common law right to which mode of
proceedings analysis applies, and where the legislature has
enacted a statute to govern such waiver, and where there is
a deviation from that statutory mandate, reversal is
required. The court came to the opposite conclusion in
Gajadhar. Recognizing that the constitution had been
amended to allow for waiver of jury, the court upheld
conviction by an eleven-person jury,249 despite the fact that
the legislature had only passed statutes authorizing a bench
trial250 or the substitution of alternate jurors.251
Furthermore, the constitution expressly grants the
legislature authority to govern “the form, content, manner
and time” of jury waiver,252 but not waiver of indictment.253
The Court of Appeals now deems it no mode of proceedings
violation for a defendant to waive the fundamental right to
a jury in situations outside the legislature‟s constitutionally
delegated statutory mandate. This may augur another
change in mode of proceedings doctrine.

246. Id. at 872-73 (quoting Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 137 (1858)).
247. Id. at 873.
248. People v. Boston, 554 N.E.2d 64, 67 & n.2 (N.Y. 1990).
249. Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 866-70.
250. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.10 (McKinney 2002).
251. See id. § 270.35(1).
252. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
253. Id. § 6.
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CONCLUSION
Intermediate appellate courts have rejected applying
mode of proceedings analysis to a number of issues. To the
extent these have not been reached by the Court of Appeals,
some issues may be found to violate the doctrine, or a
different set of facts may come within it. With each area
that the Court of Appeals has found a mode violation, the
court has seemingly found the need to emphasize the
narrowness of the issue, and often to deny its application in
a later case. Limiting mode of proceedings to procedural
issues is not much of a limitation: a host of unpreserved
procedural irregularities at trial or otherwise may be raised
in the future for review by appellate courts. As there are
probably thousands of procedural errors that could occur
during the course of trial, only the imagination of appellate
defense counsel limits the range of issues that could be
raised under the mode of proceedings umbrella.
Mode of proceedings error is specific to New York
criminal jurisprudence. It appears that the mode of
proceedings revival, which began with People v. Patterson
and continues to evolve, has proven itself a useful tool for
the Court of Appeals, allowing that court to assert
jurisdiction where a question of law has not been formally
preserved. At the same time, appellate courts as well as
appellate practitioners have had difficulty discerning
whether a particular issue constitutes a mode of
proceedings error. Guideposts in this area are difficult to
ascertain. The Court of Appeals has repeatedly emphasized
the narrowness of this exception to the preservation rule,
and has restricted or eliminated issues that previously were
found to be within the doctrine. Thus, application of mode of
proceedings to certain issues—jury sequestration, for
example—is no longer recognized. Even with these
limitations, though, this area of appellate practice will
continue to pose challenges for courts and appellate counsel.

